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Abstract
While probability theory is normally applied to
external environments, there has been some re-
cent interest in probabilistic modeling of the
outputs of computations that are too expensive
to run. Since mathematical logic is a power-
ful tool for reasoning about computer programs,
we consider this problem from the perspective
of integrating probability and logic. Recent
work on assigning probabilities to mathemati-
cal statements has used the concept of coherent
distributions, which satisfy logical constraints
such as the probability of a sentence and its
negation summing to one. Although there are
algorithms which converge to a coherent proba-
bility distribution in the limit, this yields only
weak guarantees about finite approximations
of these distributions. In our setting, this is
a significant limitation: Coherent distributions
assign probability one to all statements prov-
able in a specific logical theory, such as Peano
Arithmetic, which can prove what the output
of any terminating computation is; thus, a co-
herent distribution must assign probability one
to the output of any terminating computation.
To model uncertainty about computations, we
propose to work with approximations to coher-
ent distributions. We introduce inductive co-
herence, a strengthening of coherence that pro-
vides appropriate constraints on finite approxi-
mations, and propose an algorithm which satis-
fies this criterion.
1 Introduction
Recently there has been some interest in the problem of
assigning probabilities to the outputs of computations
which are too expensive to run. For example, Hennig,
Osborne, and Girolami (2015) call for the development
of probabilistic numerical methods that are uncertain
about their calculations; Hay and Russell (2011) study
metareasoning procedures for controlling Monte Carlo
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simulations by estimating which simulations are likely
to be effective; and Rainforth et al. (2015) give meth-
ods for estimating probabilistic program variables via
Bayesian optimization.
Formal logic is a tool that is particularly well-suited
for making claims about computations, such as claims
of the form “this computation will halt and produce
a number larger than 7” or “this computation will use
less memory than that computation” or “this operating
system’s scheduler will not deadlock” (Owre, Rushby,
and Shankar 1992; Klein et al. 2009).
When developing methods for handling uncertainty
about the results of computations, then, it is natural
to approach the problem from the angle of combining
logic with probability theory, a topic which has received
a lot of attention; see Russell (2015). Since we are us-
ing logic to reason about mathematical facts, as op-
posed to reasoning about an uncertain external world,
the approach taken by Gaifman (1964), Demski (2012),
Hutter et al. (2013), and others is particularly relevant.
This approach involves assigning probabilities to logical
sentences in a formal theory powerful enough to repre-
sent claims about computations, such as Peano Arith-
metic (PA) or Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZFC).
It is standard to study distributions P of this form
which are coherent, in that they obey some simple logi-
cal constraints such as P (⊥) = 0 and P (φ)+P (¬φ) = 1.
Coherence can be thought of as a generalization of
the notion of “consistency” to probability distributions
over sentences in logic. However, coherent distribu-
tions are uncomputable—they assign probability 1 to
all theorems, and thus, they must assign probability 1
to the statement “computation f outputs x” whenever
f() = x. For this reason, coherent probability distribu-
tions cannot represent a state of uncertainty about the
outputs of computations. Rather, they represent a final
state of knowledge about logical facts that a reasoner
might obtain if they could think forever (Cozic 2006;
Halpern and Pucella 2011).
Demski (2012) has proposed instead investigating al-
gorithms that computably approximate a coherent prob-
ability distribution, that is, algorithms that output a
series of probabilities for each sentence such that those
probabilities converge in the limit, and such that the
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distribution the approximation converges to is coher-
ent. Unfortunately, coherence in the limit is too weak
for our purposes: It does not impose constraints on
any individual finite approximation of the coherent dis-
tribution. For example, an approximation to a coher-
ent distribution might assign arbitrary probabilities to
some theorem φ right up until it proves it, then assigns
probability 1 thereafter. If φ was a statement about a
computation, this means the approximation might only
start assigning reasonable probabilities to φ after actu-
ally running the computation, which defeats the pur-
pose. To get approximations of coherent distributions
that assign reasonable probabilities to φ before running
the computation, we require some notion like coherence
that we can impose on approximations to the final dis-
tribution.
In this paper, we propose one such property, induc-
tive coherence, argue that it is a desirable generaliza-
tion of coherence to approximations of coherent distri-
butions, and show that a an inductively coherent ap-
proximation scheme exists. Roughly speaking, induc-
tive coherence demands that, for any pattern in what
is provable that can be identified by a Turing machine in
polynomial time, the approximation must recognize and
exploit that pattern “not much later” than that Turing
machine. We define this more formally in Section 2. In
Section 3 we propose a modification of Demski’s algo-
rithm (2012) and show that it is inductively coherent.
We conclude with a discussion of open problems and
future work.
Other Related Work The study of assigning prob-
abilities to sentences in mathematical logic dates back
to  Los´ (1955); Gaifman (1964); see Hailperin (1984) for
a more thorough history. Since then, the idea has been
extended to, e.g., infinitary logic (Scott and Krauss
1966), databases with uncertain data (Suciu et al. 2011),
and higher-order logic (Hutter et al. 2013). Computing
probability assignments for logical statements can be
seen as an extension of these approaches to the case
where the reasoner’s beliefs may be incoherent; see also
the work of Muin˜o (2011); Potyka and Thimm (2015),
who study methods for measuring and handling incon-
sistency in knowledge bases.
Another method for unifying logic with probabil-
ity is inductive logic programming (Muggleton and De
Raedt 1994; Nienhuys-Cheng and De Wolf 1997). For
example, De Raedt et al. (2008) have described tech-
niques for learning from proofs and program traces, and
Richardson and Domingos (2006) propose combining
first-order logic and probabilistic graphical models us-
ing a method known as “Markov logic networks.” For a
review of recent work, refer to Russell (2015).
Methods for reasoning probabilistically about the
outputs of computations are a type learning scheme
for probabilistic logic programs. For more on this sub-
ject, refer to Ng and Subrahmanian (1992); Muggleton
(1996); Sato and Kameya (1997); Poole (1997); Ngo and
Haddawy (1997); Koller and Pfeffer (1997); Lukasiewicz
(1998); Kersting, De Raedt, and Kramer (2000).
2 Inductive Coherence
In this paper we study probability distributions over
sentences of first-order logic, with the goal of describing
computable distributions that assign reasonable proba-
bilities to claims about computations that are too ex-
pensive to be run. (For example, imagine a reasoner
that wants to know whether a particular O(n2) compu-
tation will outperform a particular O(n log n) computa-
tion on a particular dataset, without taking the time
to run both computations.) We fix a theory T that is
powerful enough to make claims about computations,
such as PA. We let L denote the set of sentences is the
language of T .
“Coherence” can be seen as the natural generaliza-
tion of consistency to probability distributions. It de-
mands that theorems be certain, and the probabilities
of mutually exclusive sentences add:
Definition 1 (Coherence). A probability distribution
over sentences in L is a function P : L → [0, 1] from
sentences to probabilities. It is called coherent with re-
spect to the L-theory T if the following three conditions
hold:
1. If φ is a theorem of T , P (φ) = 1.
2. If ¬ (φ ∧ ψ) is a theorem of T , P (φ∨ψ) = P (φ)+
P (ψ).
It is not hard to see that coherence ensures P obeys
other obvious logical constraints, such as P (φ) = 1 −
P (¬φ) and P (φ→ ψ) = 1 =⇒ P (ψ) ≥ P (φ). We
say that coherence is a generalization of consistency be-
cause P agrees with T on all theorems and contradic-
tions, but can assign probabilities to undecidable sen-
tences so long as those probabilities obey logical con-
straints. Gaifman (1964) has shown that any coherent
P is isomorphic to a measure µ on complete consistent
extensions of T—in other words, a coherent P assigns
probability to undecidable sentences in a fashion that
corresponds to choosing some weighted mixture of all
possible consistent ways to assign truth values to sen-
tences.
Coherence is a very strong constraint. For exam-
ple, if T is PA, then P must assign probability 1 to
all true statements about the behavior of computations.
One way to think of a coherent distribution is that
it represents the state of knowledge a reasoner could
achieve after thinking forever, after proving everything
provable, refuting everything refutable, and assigning
consistent probabilities to everything undecidable. It
seems reasonable to ask that the limit of a good rea-
soner’s beliefs about logical statements should be co-
herent, but no computable distribution can achieve co-
herence. This motivates the study of computable ap-
proximation schemes to coherent distributions, that is,
algorithms which output a sequence of probabilities for
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each sentence such that the sequences converge, and the
resulting probability assignments are coherent.
Definition 2 (Approximation Scheme). An approxi-
mation scheme is a Turing machine M which takes as
input a natural number n and an encoding of a sentence
φ, and outputs a rational number Mn(φ) ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1].
We can think of M as a machine that runs for longer
and longer as n gets larger, producing better and bet-
ter estimates of the probability of φ each iteration. We
concern ourselves with approximation schemes that con-
verge to a coherent distribution in the limit.
Definition 3 (Approximation). An approximation
scheme M approximates P : L → [0, 1] if
lim
n→∞
Mn(φ) = P (φ)
for all φ. If there exists an M which approximates P ,
then we say that P is “approximable.”
Coherence in the limit does not impose strong con-
straints on an approximation scheme. Given a sentence
φ describing a claim about a computation, M could
simply assign it arbitrary probabilities right up until it
can run the computation, and then assign it probabil-
ity 1 or 0 thereafter. M could then be coherent in the
limit, but it would never assign reasonable non-extreme
probabilities to claims about computations too expen-
sive to run. To get an M that accurately estimates the
results of computations before it can run them, we need
to impose stronger constraints on the approximations.
Clearly, we cannot demand that the approximate
distributions Mn be completely coherent. We could
try weakening coherence by demanding that Mn assign
probability 1 to all theorems that have a proof of length
n or less, and indeed, this is the approach taken by Dem-
ski (2012). However, in our setting, this runs into the
same problem as above: M could still assign arbitrary
probabilities to a decidable φ right up until it proves
φ one way or the other, and might not have anything
reasonable to say about the behavior of computations
before running them. We require some other weakening
of coherence that ensuresM places reasonable probabil-
ities on φ before it can run the computation.
Intuitively, we want M to start noticing patterns in
computations before it’s able to actually run them. For
example, consider some computation f that takes an
input and either outputs 1, outputs 0, or loops. Let φn
be the claim f(n) = 0 and ψn be the claim f(n) = 1.
We want M to start assigning probabilities to φn and
ψn that sum to at most 1, and we want it to start doing
so before it can simply compute f(n).
More generally, we want M to recognize patterns
such as “these claims are mutually exclusive” and
“these claims are equivalent.” We formalize this idea
as follows. Take any method for quickly (in polyno-
mial time) identifying patterns of this form. A good
approximation scheme should eventually be able to rec-
ognize and exploit that pattern, and “not much slower”
than the polynomial time method, even if the size of
the shortest proof that the pattern holds grows super-
exponentially.
Definition 4 (Quickly Computable). A sequence of
sentences {φn} is called quickly computable if there ex-
ists a Turing machine that outputs all the sentences in
the sequence in order, and outputs φn by a time polyno-
mial in n.
Definition 5 (Inductive Coherence). An approxima-
tion scheme M is called inductively coherent with re-
spect to T if it satisfies the following three conditions:
1. limn→∞Mn(⊥) = 0
2. limn→∞Mn(φn) converges whenever {φn} is
quickly computable and φn → φn+1 is provable
in T for all n.
3. limn→∞Mn(φn) +Mn(ψn) +Mn(χn) = 1 when-
ever {φn}, {ψn}, and {χn} are quickly com-
putable, and for all n, it is provable in T that
{φn, ψn, χn} is a partition of truth (meaning ex-
actly one of them is true).
To gain an intuition for how Definition 5 guarantees
that an inductively coherent M recognizes patterns in
quickly computable sequences “not much slower” than
the Turing machine q that quickly computes them,
imagine that q(n) outputs pairs (φn, ψn) in time poly-
nomial in n such that each φn is provably equivalent to
ψn, but the shortest proof of equivalence grows super-
exponentially fast in n. We want M to eventually, on
some iteration n and thereafter, “recognize the pattern”
and start assigning roughly the same probabilities to
φn and ψn. Note that this is a claim about the itera-
tion n by which M must start recognizing the pattern
identified by q, not a claim about the runtime ofMn(φ)
on an individual φ, which may be exponential or worse.
Theorem 1. If M is inductively coherent, and {φn}
and {ψn} are quickly computable, and φn is provably
equivalent to ψn for all n, then
lim
n→∞
Mn(φn)−Mn(ψn) = 0.
Proof. If {φn} is quickly computable then so is {¬φn}.
The constant sequence {⊥} is quickly computable. Ap-
ply property 3 to the sequences {φn}, {¬φn}, and {⊥},
and then to {ψn}, {¬φn}, {⊥}. Subtracting the results,
we have
lim
n→∞
Mn(φn) +Mn(¬φn)−Mn(ψn)−Mn(¬φn) = 0,
because limn→∞Mn(⊥) = 0.
Provable equivalence is only one type of pattern that
an inductively coherent M exploits before it can find
the associated proofs. As a second example, if there
is any quickly computable method for identifying sen-
tences that are provable (even if the proofs are very
long), then M must recognize those patterns as well.
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Theorem 2. If M is inductively coherent, for any
quickly computable sequence {φn} of theorems of T we
have
lim
n→∞
Mn(φn) = 1.
Proof. Apply property 3 to the sequences {φn}, {⊥},
{⊥}. Since each φn is provable, we have partitions of
truth as desired, and limn→∞Mn(⊥) = 0.
This implies that the criterion of inductive coherence
captures some of what it means to reason well about
computations that are too expensive to run. Recall
that statements making true claims about the output
of a computation are theorems, because the statement
can be proven by providing an execution trace of the
computation. Theorem 2 implies that if there is a
polynomial-time method for generating true statements
about computations, then after some number of itera-
tions n, Mn incorporates that pattern into its probabil-
ity assignments.
Property 1 of Definition 5 is fairly trivial. Prop-
erty 2 implies that Mn(φn) converges if {φn} is quickly
computable and all the φn are provably equivalent; the
more general form of Property 2 is used in Theorem 4.
Property 3 is the meat of inductive coherence; it ensures
M recognizes exclusivity relationships between provable
sentences. While Definition 5 only mentions partitions
of truth of size 3, it is strong enough to guarantee M
recognizes arbitrarily large partitions of truth.
Theorem 3. If M is inductively coherent, for any
list of k quickly computable sequences of sentences,
{φ1n}, . . . {φ
k
n}, such that for each n, it’s provable that
φin is true for exactly one i, we have that
lim
n→∞
k∑
i=1
Mn(φ
i
n) = 1.
Proof. The proof works by induction on k. For k = 1,
this is Theorem 2. For k = 2, apply property 3 to the
sequences {φ1n}, {φ
2
n}, {⊥}. For k = 3, this is exactly
property 3.
For k > 3, consider the list {φ1n}, . . . {φ
k−2
n }, {φ
k−1
n ∨
φkn}; the list {φ
k−1
n }, {φ
k
n}, {¬(φ
k−1
n ∨φ
k
n)}; and the list
{φk−1n ∨ φ
k
n}, {¬(φ
k−1
n ∨ φ
k
n)}.
These lists are of length k − 1, 3, and 2 re-
spectively and all satisfy the conditions of this theo-
rem. Apply this theorem to all three lists, add the
first two results and subtract the third. This gives
limn→∞
∑k
i=1Mn(φ
i
n) = 1 + 1− 1 = 1.
Intuitively, an inductively coherent M is good at
identifying any pattern in what is provable that can be
expressed using the properties of Definition 5. As an
example, observe that if q can quickly compute an infi-
nite sequence of provably mutually exclusive sentences,
M must eventually start noticing that those sentences
are mutually exclusive, not much later than q:
Theorem 4. If M is inductively coherent, then for a
quickly computable sequence of mutually exclusive sen-
tences, {φn}, we have limn→∞Mn(φn) = 0.
Proof. Define ψn to be the disjunction of all
φi≤n. Applying property 2 to {ψn}, we have that
limn→∞Mn(ψn) converges to some p. Applying prop-
erty 3 to the sequences {ψn}, {¬ψn}, and {⊥}, we have
that limn→∞Mn(¬ψn) converges to 1 − p. Therefore,
applying property 3 to {ψn−1}, {φn}, and {¬ψn} shows
that limn→∞Mn(φn) = 0 as desired. (Note that {ψn},
{¬ψn}, and {ψn−1} are all quickly computable if {φn}
is.)
Does an inductively coherent M quickly identify all
quickly identifiable patterns in claims about computa-
tions? Probably not; limitations are discussed in Sec-
tion 4. However, we can show that M will eventually
identify all patterns in which sentences are provable,
by showing that an inductively coherent M is coher-
ent in the limit. This may be surprising at first glance,
given that Definition 5 only mentions convergence for se-
quences that can be computed in polynomial time. The
trick is that any constant sequence φn := φ is “quickly
computable,” by the Turing machine that ignores n and
always outputs φ.
Theorem 5. If M is inductively coherent, then
P (φ) := lim
n→∞
Mn(φ)
is well-defined, approximable, and coherent.
Proof. That P (φ) is well-defined follows from property
2 and the fact that the constant sequence {φ} is quickly
computable for any φ. Approximability then follows
trivially from the definition of P (φ). P (φ) is in [0, 1]
becauseMn(φ) is in [0, 1], and the limit of any sequence
in [0, 1] is in [0, 1]. It remains to show that P is coherent.
The first property of coherence follows from proper-
ties 1 and 3 with the partition {φ,⊥,⊥}. The second
follows with the partition {φ, ψ,¬φ ∧ ¬ψ}.
Thus we see that we are justified in saying that an in-
ductively coherent M must both quickly identify some
patterns in what is provable, and eventually identify all
patterns. This implies an inductively coherentM would
assign reasonable probabilities to sentences describing
the behavior of computations, even before the compu-
tation can be run, because statements about compu-
tations are decidable. If there is any polynomial-time
method for accurately noticing relationships between
computations, M will eventually recognize it and dis-
tribute its probability mass accordingly.
One way to look at inductive coherence is this: Co-
herence in the limit requires that each individual sen-
tence is eventually assigned a reasonable probability,
possibly only after that sentence is decided. Inductive
coherence requires that there is some uniform bound
past which all theorems that can be quickly identified
as theorems start to be assigned high probability, as
quickly as they can be identified.
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3 An Inductively Coherent Approxima-
tion Scheme
We now turn our attention to providing an induc-
tively coherent approximation scheme M∗ which ap-
proximates a coherent distribution P ∗. We do this by
defining a variant of the distribution and approximation
scheme defined by Demski (2012), and showing that our
variant is inductively coherent.
We begin by defining an uncomputable process
(which we later show to be approximable) that builds
a random complete, consistent extension T ∗ of T . We
define P ∗(φ) to be the probability that φ ∈ T ∗ if T ∗ is
sampled according to this process. To build T ∗, we sam-
ple random Turing machines according to a simplicity
prior, and interpret their outputs as claims about which
sentences are true. If the machine makes claims that are
consistent with T ∗ so far, we add those claims to T ∗ and
repeat. Otherwise we discard that machine and repeat.
Continuing indefinitely, T ∗ will (with probability 1) be
a complete consistent extension of T in the limit.
To formalize this idea, fix a universal Turing ma-
chine U with an advance-only output tape, with its in-
put tape initialized to a random infinite bitstring b. We
can interpret an infinite bitstring as a self-delimiting en-
coding of a Turing machine followed by a specification
of the initial state of that machine’s tape. Fix an enu-
meration of sentences in the language L, and interpret
the output of U on input tape b as a sequence of sen-
tences. Write U(b) for the set of sentences output by U
on the input b, and write Ut(b) for the finite set of sen-
tences output during the first t steps of operation. For
a finite bitstring x, write U(x) = S if U(b) = S for all b
which have x as a prefix, and similarly for Ut(x). Note
that if the length of x is at least t, then Ut(x) is always
well-defined, because U cannot read more than t input
bits in t steps. The (uncomputable) process converging
on T ∗ is then defined by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: A method for constructing a com-
plete, consistent extension of T .
Input: b1, b2, . . . , an infinite list of infinite
bitstrings.
Data: T ∗ ← T , the extension of T under
construction.
for b in b1, b2, . . . :
if T ∗ ∪ U(b) is consistent :
T ∗ ← T ∗ ∪ U(b)
We define P ∗(φ) to be the probability that φ ∈ T ∗
when the bi are chosen uniformly at random (e.g., by
fair coin tosses; recall that a single stream of coin tosses
can encode an infinite sequence of infinite bitstrings).
P ∗ has the desirable property that, for every noncon-
tradictory sentence φ, P ∗(φ) is lower-bounded by the
complexity of the Turing machine that outputs only φ.
To see this, let wφ be the bitstring encoding that ma-
chine with respect to U ; the chance that b1 starts with
wφ is at least 2
−|wφ|.
To see that P ∗(φ) is coherent, note that with prob-
ability 1 T ∗ is a complete consistent extension of T , so
P ∗ is isomorphic to a distribution µ over complete con-
sistent extensions of T , which means it is coherent (Gaif-
man 1964). P ∗ is uncomputable, but can be approxi-
mated by Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Computable approximation
scheme for P ∗
def Claimsn(b1, . . . , b2n):
Φ← the first n axioms of T
for i in 0 . . . 2n :
S ← U2n (bi) interpreted as a list of sentences
if Conn(Φ ∪ S) :
Φ← Φ ∪ S
for φ in Φ :
output(φ)
def Conn(Φ):
if a proof of length ≤ 2n proves Φ inconsistent :
return false
for S ⊂ Φ :
for φ of length ≤ 2n such that S ∩ {φ,¬φ} is
empty :
if ¬Conn(S ∪ {φ}) and ¬Conn(S ∪ {¬φ}) :
return false
return true
def M∗n(φ) :
return the probability Claimsn(b1, . . . , b2n )
outputs φ when the bi are uniform random
bitstrings of length 2n.
Of note is the function Conn, which checks whether a
set of sentences Φ is “consistent enough” for time n. It
checks not only whether Φ can be proven inconsistent
with a proof of length 2n or less, but also whether there
is a subset S ⊂ Φ and sentence φ such that both Φ∪{φ}
and Φ ∪ {¬φ} can be proven inconsistent in length 2n.
(This implies that Φ is inconsistent, but the proof may
be longer than length 2n unless one of φ or ¬φ is added.)
This gives Conn a convenient closure property.
Theorem 6. M∗ is an inductively coherent approxima-
tion scheme which approximates P ∗.
We show that M∗ recognizes quickly computable theo-
rems, which is suggestive. The rest of the proof is in
Appendix A.
Lemma 1. If {φn} is a quickly computable sequence of
theorems, then limn→∞M
∗
n(φn) = 1.
Proof. Write Φn for a random run of
Claimsn(b1 . . . b2n) when the bi are chosen uni-
formly at random. We want to show that, for n large
enough, P(φn ∈ Φn) > 1 − ε. Since {φn} is quickly
computable, there exists a finite bitstring wφ such that
U(wφ) outputs the sentences {φn} in order, and for all
sufficiently large n, φn ∈ U2n(wφ).
There exists a N0 such that with probability at least
1 − ε/2, at least one of b1 . . . b2N0 starts with wφ, and
φn ∈ U2n(wφ) for all n ≥ N0. There also exists a
N1 such that with probability 1 − ε/2, for every sub-
set S of {1, . . .2N1}, either T ∪
⋃
i∈S U(bi) is consistent
or ¬ConN1
(
T ∪
⋃
i∈S U2N1 (bi)
)
; simply choose N1 large
enough that any inconsistencies can be uncovered with
sentences output by time 2N1 and proofs of length less
than 2N1 . (This is possible because only finitely many
proofs of inconsistency are needed.)
Choose N1 ≥ N0. For all n ≥ N1, with probability
at least 1 − ε/2, one of the sampled machines (namely
wφ) outputs φi for all i ≤ n. Then, with probability
at least 1− ε/2, this implies that this machine will end
up contributing to Φn because any machine before wφ
inconsistent with wφ (which outputs only theorems) has
been discarded. Therefore, with probability at least
1− ε, φn ∈ Φn.
4 Conclusions
We have proposed inductive coherence as a strength-
ening of coherence in the limit. Inductive coherence
requires that computable distributions assign probabil-
ities to claims about computations that are reasonable
before they’re able to run these computations. Specifi-
cally, if there is any polynomial-time method for iden-
tifying patterns in what is provable, an inductively co-
herent M must eventually recognize and exploit that
pattern, eventually assigning probabilities that are co-
herent with respect to that pattern. This implies that
inductive coherence captures some of what we mean
when we ask for a probability distribution that assigns
reasonable probabilities to claims about computations.
However, an inductively coherent M doesn’t neces-
sarily recognize all patterns in the behavior of compu-
tations. For example, consider: Is the 10100’th decimal
digit of pi a 7? It seems that in lieu of additional knowl-
edge and the ability to compute the digit, a reasonable
estimator should assign this event 10% probability. Rea-
sonable predictors of computations should be able to
recognize similar patterns, such as “this computation
returns an error one time in ten,” and assign probabili-
ties accordingly.
More formally, imagine we have some sequence
of deterministic computations that output a one on
1/10 of their inputs. Imagine further that there is
no polynomial-time algorithm that has better average
squared error, when predicting this sequence, than the
algorithm “output(1/10).” It seems reasonable to ask
that a predictor of computations start assigning prob-
ability 1/10 to the next element in the sequence even-
tually, until it has enough resources to compute the
actual answer. However, we have no reason to expect
that an inductively coherent M would have this prop-
erty. Garrabrant et al. (2016) study computable dis-
tributions that can do this; it is not yet clear how to
reconcile our framework with theirs.
This demonstrates that further constraints on ap-
proximation schemes are likely necessary before we can
define computable distributions that are able to recog-
nize all the patterns in the behavior of computations
that humans can easily recognize. Inductive coherence
gives us approximate distributions that have some desir-
able properties in their predictions about computations,
but more work is needed before we can say we under-
stand how to assign reasonable uncertainty to claims
about computations in general.
A Proof that M∗ is Inductively Coher-
ent
Let b1, b2, . . . be an infinite list of infinite bitstrings, gen-
erated uniformly at random. Let T ∗ be the complete
extension of T that Algorithm 1 converges to on the
input b1, b2, . . . Let Φn = Claimsn(b1, b2, . . .). Note
that Claimsn only reads the first 2
n bits of the first 2n
bitstrings.
Lemma 2. If {φn} is a quickly computable sequence of
sentences, then
lim
n→∞
M∗n(φn) +M
∗
n(¬φn) = 1.
Proof. Since {φn} is quickly computable, there is a pre-
fix wφ such that U(wφx) outputs φn in polynomial time
if x encodes n. We can chose wφ such that x encodes n
in 2 log2(n) bits. Therefore, if x is an infinite uniform
random bitstring, U(wφx) will output φn with proba-
bility at least 2−2 log2(n) = n−2.
Similarly, there exists a finite bitstring w′φ such that
if x is a uniform random bitstring, U(w′φx) outputs the
single sentence ¬φn in polynomial time with probability
at least n−2. If wφ and w
′
φ are each at most k bits long,
the probability that wφx and w
′
φx are prefixes for some
bi, bj ∈ {b1, b2, . . . b2n} is at least 1 − (1 − 2
1−kn−2)2
n
.
This converges to 1 as n goes to ∞. Therefore, with
probability converging to one, there exist bi and bj with
i, j ≤ 2n such that U2n(bi) is the singleton containing
φn and U2n(bj) is the singleton containing ¬φn. With-
out loss of generality, assume i < j. We want to show
that if both of these sentences are sampled, exactly one
of φn or ¬φn is in Φn.
Clearly, the set {φn,¬φn} and all its supersets will
be rejected by Conn, so φn ¬φn are not both in Φn.
Let Φkn be the value of Φ in Claimsn(b1, b2, . . .) after
k iterations of the for loop. Assume that neither φn
nor ¬φn are in Φn. Thus, Conn rejects Φ
i
n ∪ {φn} and
Φjn∪{¬φn}. Adding more sentences to the input of Conn
cannot cause it to accept, so Conn rejects Φ
j
n ∪ {φn} as
well. Thus, Conn accepts Φ
i
n but rejects Φ
j
n ∪ {φn} and
Φjn ∪ {¬φn}. This is a contradiction, so as n goes to
∞, with probability approaching 1, exactly one of φn
or ¬φn is in Φn.
Lemma 3. limn→∞M
∗
n(⊥) = 0.
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Proof. From Lemma 1, we have limn→∞M
∗
n(¬⊥) = 1.
From Lemma 2, we have limn→∞M
∗
n(⊥) +M
∗
n(¬⊥) =
1. Together, this gives limn→∞M
∗
n(⊥) = 0.
Lemma 4. limn→∞M
∗
n(φn) converges whenever {φn}
is quickly computable and φn → φn+1 for all n.
Proof. Because each φn implies φn+1, in every complete
consistent extension of T , either there is some greatest
index k such that φk is false, or φn is always false. For
k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,∞}, let {φkn} be the sequence given by
φkn = φn if n ≥ k and φ
k
n = ¬φn otherwise. Note
that for each k, {φkn} is quickly computable, and that
with probability 1, there exists exactly one k such that
φki ∈ T
∗ for all i. Note that
M∗n(φn) =
∑
k
P(φn ∈ Φn | ∀i φ
k
i ∈ T
∗)P(∀i φki ∈ T
∗),
so it suffices to show that P(φn ∈ Φn | ∀i φ
k
i ∈ T
∗)
converges for each k, because a weighted average of
bounded sequences each of which converge also con-
verges.
Fix a k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,∞}. Let p = P(∀i φki ∈ T
∗) and
let ε > 0. Using the same approach as in the proof
of Lemma 1, we can choose N1 such that, for n > N1,
with probability at least 1−pε, we have (∀i φki ∈ T
∗)→
φkn ∈ Φn. The probability of the conjunction P (φ
k
n ∈
Φn ∧ ∀i φ
k
i ∈ T
∗) is then at least p − pε. Therefore,
P(φkn ∈ Φn | ∀i φ
k
i ∈ T
∗) ≥ 1− ε for all n ≥ N1, so
lim
n→∞
P(φkn ∈ Φn | ∀i φ
k
i ∈ T
∗)
converges. For k <∞, limn→∞ P(φn ∈ Φn | ∀i φ
k
i ∈ T
∗)
converges, because {φkn} is eventually just {φn}. For
k = ∞, it also converges, because φkn = ¬φn, and as
seen in the proof of Lemma 2, with probability converg-
ing to 1, exactly one of φn and ¬φn is in Φn.
Lemma 5. limn→∞M
∗
n(φn) +M
∗
n(ψn) +M
∗
n(χn) = 1
whenever {φn}, {ψn}, and {χn} are quickly computable,
and for all n, {φn, ψn, χn} is a partition of truth.
Proof. First, observe that
{(φn∧¬ψn∧¬χn)∨(¬φn∧ψn∧¬χn)∨(¬φn∧¬ψn∧χn)}
is a quickly computable sequence of theorems. By
Lemma 1, each of these sentences must be in Φn once
n is large.
As seen in the proof of Lemma 2, when n is large
we also have that with probability 1, exactly one of φn
and ¬φn is in Φn, exactly one of ψn and ¬ψn is in Φn,
and exactly one of χn and ¬χn is in Φn.
Since Φn contains no set of sentences from which one
can prove a contradiction in fewer than 2n steps, this
means that Φn must eventually contain exactly one of
φn, ψn, and χn. Therefore,
lim
n→∞
P(φn ∈ Φn) + P(ψn ∈ Φn) + P(χn ∈ Φn) = 1.
Lemma 6. limn→∞M
∗
n(φ) = P
∗(φ).
Proof. It suffices to show that for all φ,
lim
n→∞
P(φ ∈ Φn) = P(φ ∈ T
∗).
Note that in the proof of Lemma 4, if we take
{φn} to be the sequence which is constantly φ and
considering k = 0 and k = ∞, we showed that for
sufficiently large n, P(φ ∈ Φn | φ ∈ T
∗) ≥ 1 − ε and
P(¬φ ∈ Φn | ¬φ ∈ T
∗) ≥ 1 − ε. Since φ and ¬φ cannot
both be in Φn for sufficiently large n, this means that
|P(φ ∈ Φn)− P(φ ∈ T
∗)| < ε, so limn→∞ P(φ ∈ Φn) =
P(φ ∈ T ∗).
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